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Of all the events in American life, none seems to have 
stimulated the production of a greater bulk of literature, 
historical or otherwise, than the Civil War. Aside from the 
inspiration afforded by the rather dramatic quality of the war 
itself, probably no other episode in American history has aroused 
such widespread partisan feeling or so strong a disposition to 
apportion blame, to excuse, vindioate, or explain, publicly, the 
causes and events of the conflict. Consequently, in the years 
immediately following the war, many participants, both actual and 
vicarious, kept an interested public supplied with a quantity of 
literature that was usually either panegyrical or polemical in tone. 
As a result, a "correct" Northern and an equally "correct" Southern 
interpretation was developed rapidly; and before long, general opinion 
in both sections, supported by common memories and prejudices, was 
crystallized into an almost impervious tradition. 
Time itself has tended to make brittle these accumulated 
myths and legends. Furthermore, new sources of information have 
been exploited, new generations of writers have matured, and new 
points of view on the subject of history itself — its proper 
content, uses, and methods — have been developed and have operated 
to erode the surface of the older beliefs and assumptions.  For example, 
as a result of thorough investigation and study of newer material by 
racent historians trained in the improved standards of scholarship, 
some of the earlier explanations of the causes of the Civil War have 
been extensively revised. Neither slavery as a moral issue, nor the 
diabolical machinations of Southern planters for control of the federal 
government are accepted by modern historians as valid interpretations 
for the origins of the war. Equally obsolete as whole answers to the 
riddle are the old dogmas of states-rights and extreme sectional 
differences.  Similarly, several hoary hypotheses concerning sectional 
unity, loyalty, and enthusiasm for war have been exploded and relegated 
to the museum of historical curios.  Finally, as a further result of this 
modified research, some of the revisionists have begun to question 
seriously the traditional acceptance of the inevitability of the 
"irrepressible conflict". 
This new trend in historical treatment of the causes and 
events of the Civil War not only reflects diminution of partisan 
sentiment, but also altered traditions in the study and writing of 
American history.  Ideas in historiography seem to be closely linked 
with the spirit of their time; and changing thought regarding the 
complex social, economic, political, and psychological factors of the 
Civil War is a rather significant indication of the development of a 
broadened view of the scope of history and the function of the historian. 
Today, neither undiscriminating narration nor bare chronological recital 
of facts is regarded as sufficient for a full understanding of the 
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meaning of the past.  In addition, the adaptation of the methods 
and techniques of science not only mirrors modern emphasis and 
dependence upon technology, but, in general, provides also for 
more critical selection and evaluation of evidence and insures a 
oloser approximation of the truth in interpreting past events. 
Probably the attainment of truth for truth's sake would 
be in itself a worthy end for the efforts of historians. When, 
however, in accordance with the democratic ideal, governmental 
policy and action is determined by the judgment and opinion of the 
voters, the practical value of the growth of American historiography 
can be measured best in relation to the maturity of the political 
and economic behavior of the American people. Naturally, judgments 
based largely upon an accumulation of prejudice and myth can hardly 
be expected to be sound or even equitable. Since the history taught 
in public schools is usually the source of the conceptions upon which 
these decisions are reached, and since this history frequently has 
been the primary agent for the propagation and perpetuation of legend 
through textbook and teaching, it is also significant that the newer 
historians seem more aware than their predecessors of their obligation 
to provide the fullest and most comprehensive interpretation of past 
experiments in society and social institutions. 
As in the case of remote crises, the present uncertainty in 
world affairs  has  brought  into sharper focus the  need for more 
critical study  of the past  in order to  cope  intelligently with 
contemporary problems  in social relations.    And now that the Civil 
War can be  contemplated in better perspective, a serious 
re-examination of its antecedents  at this time is  especially 
pertinent  in the hope that  new light shed upon the  complex causes 
for war may throw into  relief some  of the equally  complex factors 
which make  for peace. 
Obviously,  the very complexity  of the nature of the  Civil 
War would operate to narrow the  scope  of this paper to  little more 
than an outline  of the history  of American history since  1865, 
illustrated by a few of the outstanding changes  in the  interpretations 
of the war and their influence  on the  so-called American mind through 
textbooks  and teaching. 
AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY SINCE 1865 
One  of the many by-products  of the Civil War was a  rather 
general stimulation of both professional  and lay interest  in the 
entire  field of American history.    During the  first  twenty years 
following the war the  important  business  of collecting and 
publishing archival material was  extended by such men as  Henry 
Harisse,   Joseph Sabin,  and  Justin Winsor;  and several periodicals 
dealing with biographical and historical material were  introduced 
in Philadelphia and New York.     Public  interest  in history was 
intensified also  by the publication of the memoirs  of leading 
figures  in the war.     Often these personal sketches were  printed 
as  serials  in popular magazines  and journals,  and perhaps the 
most  famous  of all the series was  the one published by the 
Century Magazine  between 1885 and 1888.       The  separate articles 
written by Grant,  McClellan,  Sherman,  and others,  were  later 
2 
edited and  reissued as  books which proved to be extremely popular. 
Equally marketable were the narrative accounts of officers 
and men who had served in the armies during the conflict. Some of 
these authors,  possessed of a fairly keen historical sense,  had kept 
1. Michael Kraus, A History of American History  (New York* 
Farrar & Rinehart,  Inc.,  1937),  pp.  297-299. 
2. Robert U.  Johnson and Clarence  C.  Buel  (eds.), 
Battles and LeaderB  of the  Civil War  (People's  Pictorial Edition; 
New Yorkj  The Century Co.,   1884-87),  pp.   7-47 passim. 
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running records of their own experiences and those of the companies 
3 
and regiments in which they served.  For most of the writers, however, 
preservation of a record of events for future time was a secondary 
and incidental concern.  Their primary purpose was to eulogize the 
honored dead, preserve the memory of heroic action, or extol the 
cause for whioh they fought.  Usually, of course, the accounts reveal 
4 
a combination of each* 
Judging from the sheer volume of the literature on the war 
prisons alone, the experiences of the prisoners, painful as they 
must have been, evidently afforded a perverse satisfaction to the 
reading public.  Eighty-two books and articles giving the experiences 
5 
of prisoners in the South were published between 1862 and 1866. 
Naturally, these testimonials, written by suffering men during a 
period of aroused feeling, did not provide a reasoned or balanced 
record of prison conditions or of treatment of prisoners.  Yet these 
accounts were for some time the only source material on this aspect 
of the war available to serious historians attempting to write histories 
of the period. 
3. John A. Sloan, Reminiscences of the Guilford Greys, Co. B. 
27th N. C. Regiment (Washington, D. C: R. 0. Polkenhorn, Printer, 
1883), preface. 
4. William B. Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons (Columbus: The Ohio 
State University Press, 1930), pp. 248-249. 
5. Ibid., p. 247. 
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Juat as provocative  of biased  interpretations  of the era 
were the more  comprehensive explanations written by leaders  on both 
sides.     Jefferson Davis wrote  and published  his  history of the 
Confederacy with the avowed purpose of proving by "historical 
authority" that the Southern states  had the  right to aecede  and that 
"the war, on the part  of the Government  of the  United States,  was  a 
war of aggression and usurpation".6    ^ equally heavy contribution 
toward obscuring the truth and  complicating the work of later 
historians was made  by  John G.  Nicolay and John  Hay in their 
Abraham Lincoln:  A History which,  of course,   sanctioned the  Northern 
7 
antislavery view of the war.       Given these types  of sources,  and 
living and writing in the North,  historians  understandably 
established a tenacious  Northern interpretation  of the war as the 
8 
"official version". 
During the decade in whioh this diagnosis was evolved, two 
main currents of thought appeared to be influencing the course of 
American historiography. These influences reflected, on the one hand, 
the rising spirit of nationalism and belief in the manifest destiny 
of the United States; and, on the other, the near deification of the 
6. Jefferson Davis, A Short History of the Confederate States of 
America (New York: Bedford Company, Publishers, 1890), p. 504. 
7. Charles W. Bamsdell, "The Changing Interpretation of the Civil 
War," Journal of Southern History, III (February, 1937), 9. 
8. Ibid., p. 4. 
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methods  and techniques  of science.    Both notions,  of course,  pointed 
to the  prevailing ideal  of progress. 
Until about  1900, and therefore  during the period in which 
the  first more  or less  professional histories  of the Civil War were 
being written,  nationalism was the dominant note in the writing and 
interpreting of American history.    Many of the  first  group of historians 
who wrote  on the  Civil War era were trained to use  documents  and weigh 
evidence,   but they did not  believe that a mere  statement of fact was 
the  only duty and function of their profession.    While they professed 
impartiality,  nearly all  of them passed judgment on the morality of 
slaveholding and  indicted the South for defending a  decadent  way  of 
9 
life and  for interrupting and  retarding national progress.       Completely 
uninterested in either social  or economic history,  they scarcely 
realized that,  as a matter of fact,  the  Civil War was  extremely 
fateful  in precipitating social and economic change  in the  United States. 
Among the  group  of writers  of the  "nationalist" school,  Herman 
E.  von Hoist was  a pioneer in writing an extensive account  of the Civil 
War.     Since  his work was  geared to the  concepts  held by his  generation 
on the moral  issue of slavery,  and since  he was  inclined to select  for 
his history  only that material which supported his thesis, von Hoist'8 
9.     Kraus,   op.   clt.,   pp.   336-337. 
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conclusions have been now discarded; but he remains an important 
figure in the development of American historiography because he was 
one of the first historians to make any systematic use of newspapers, 
and also of the Congressional Globe and other previously ignored 
10 
governmental documents. 
A contemporary of von Hoist, James Schouler, who was similarly 
intrigued by political and constitutional history, established another 
precedent in American historiography by writing a continuous narrative 
which was published in 1899 and covered the history of the United States 
from the beginnings of the nation to the close of the Reconstruction era. 
In addition to exploiting manuscript material from the library of 
Congress, Schouler depended largely upon "personal knowledge, real or 
assumed, of persons, plaoes, and events" gleaned from his own intimate 
12 
contacts in Washington.   Having served for nine months, in 1862-1863, 
in the Union Army, he shared the views of those who held the South 
responsible for the war; but he did preach and practice a greater 
attention to scholarly methods and impartiality, though, anticipating 
the followers of the subjective school of interpretation, he both 
recognized the difficulty of achieving objectivity and, in the fashion 
of his time, preferred to be biased if that were necessary to teach the 
11 
10. Charles  R.  Wilson,  "Hermann Eduard von Hoist," in The Marcus 
W.   Jernegan Essays  in American Historiography,  ed.  by William T. 
Hutchinson  (Chicago:  The  University of Chicago Press,   1937),  pp.  64-82 passim. 
11. Kraus,  op.   cit.,  p.  349. 
12. Lewis Ethan Ellis, "James Schouler," Jernegan Essays, p. 90. 
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13 
moral lessons of history. 
Edward Channing was another historian who conceived the idea 
of writing a "complete" history of the United States.  His plan was 
to begin with the era of discovery and end at the close of the 
nineteenth century.  Channing, too, had tremendous faith in progress; 
and the single hypothesis which permeated his work presupposed a 
14 
relentless march of events  toward national unity. 
Although his preoccupation with one general theme  led him to 
neglect many vital  factors  in American history,  Channing did include 
much new material found in manuscript  collections and foreign archives. 
He especially  liked to unearth ouriosities  and often attached importance 
to them simply because they had been previously unexplored.    Despite the 
fact  that this  habit frequently led him to  include  somewhat  unreliable 
and prejudiced information,   Channing's  delight  in confounding tradition 
may qualify him perhaps  as  one of the  forerunners  of the more  recent 
15 
revisionists. 
Perhaps the giant of this  group of patriotic historians was 
James  Ford Khodes.     His monumental  History  of the  United States  from the 
Compromise  of  1850 was  concluded finally in nine volumes,  published during 
13. Ibid., pp.  93-98. 
14. Ralph Ray Fahrney,   "Edward Channing,"  Jernegan Essays, 
pp.  295-307 passim. 
15. Ibid., pp.  309-310. 
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the years  1893 to 1922.    Superficially,  Rhodes,   coming as  he  did 
from the West,  might  have  been expected to develop a thesis  diverging 
somewhat  from the conventional antislavery theme.     However,  his 
birthplace,  Cleveland,  was the  center of much  of the western activity 
of the abolitionist  societies  before the war;   and,  in addition,  he 
had inherited a  New England conscience which inclined him to cling 
stubbornly to fixed  ideas  long after New England itself had become 
considerably more tolerant.     His  action in  returning to New England 
in his mature  life and entering Boston literary  circles  did not  help 
to mitigate his  persuasion that  slavery was  a sin against  God and man. 
But Rhodes,   let  it be  said to his  credit, was  unusually  fair in his 
treatment  of Confederate  leaders.    In Khodes's  pages,  Jefferson Davis 
loses many  of the  satanic attributes  which the  earlier and more 
17 
impassioned writers had assigned to the Confederate President. 
Actually, his distortion of the character and personality of Stephen 
A. Douglas is the most serious oharge against him.  He intended to be 
impartial, but his entanglement in the affairs of the Douglas family as 
16 
16. Raymond Curtis Miller,  "James Ford Rhodes," Jernegan Essays, 
pp.   171-174;  p.   184. 
17. William A. Dunning,  "Rhodes's History of the  United States", 
Educational  Review, XXXIV  (September,   1907),   112. 
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executor of the Douglas estate prevented a more characteristically 
18 
balanced analysis of the "Little Giant". 
Rhodes entertained some notions about history, whioh, because 
of his position as a leading historian of his day, had considerable 
influence on American historiography.  He was determined to achieve 
unity in his work by paying less attention to particular facts than 
to the dramatic quality and sweeping movement of the whole, and the 
Civil War period provided just those epic elements necessary for his 
purpose.  Unfortunately, the weaknesses in his work stem from the fact 
that unity could be achieved only by omitting material which seemed 
irrelevant to his antislavery theme. As a result, he produced a 
history of the slavery struggle which was thoroughly subjective, but 
he differed significantly from Schouler and von Hoist in that he claimed 
at least to have reached his opinion on the slavery question after an 
19 
impartial investigation of facts. 
Objective  investigation of facts  had hitherto  been paid scant 
heed in American historiography,  although some  restraint in  judgments 
18. Frank H.   Hodder,  "Propaganda as  a Source  of American History," 
Mississippi Valley  Historical Review,  IX (June,   1922),  pp.  3-18 passim. 
19. Raymond Curtis Miller,  "James  Ford Rhodes,"   Jernegan Essays, 
p.   176. 
-13- 
and caution in language were  evident  in the historical writing of 
the  eighties.    During the  last  decade of  the  nineteenth century, 
this  idea was  strengthened and  spread by  students who,   having attended 
German universities,  had returned to Amerioan schools  and colleges 
determined to apply the methods  of physical science to historical 
investigation and writing then   in vogue  in Europe.     Thoroughly  imbued 
with the principles  of Charles  Darwin, August Comte,  and Leopold von 
Ranke,  these young men established seminar courses  at  Hopkins, 
Harvard,  Cornell,  and Michigan,  where advanoed students  of  history 
20 
were  trained in the new techniques  of researoh. 
According to the tenets  of the German historian von Ranke, 
the  function of history was  to  show only what  had actually occurred 
at any given time.     In order to accomplish this,  all the  facts  involved 
in an event were to be ascertained wherever they could  be found,  tested 
and weighed for validity,  and then narrated without attempting to draw 
conclusions  or determine  cause  and effect.    Von Ranke's theory was both 
challenged and extended by the  English historian and disciple  of Comte, 
Henry Thomas Buckle.    With true  nineteenth century faith  in science, 
Buckle  believed that  it was possible,  and even necessary,  to deduce  from 
20.    Kraus,  op.  oit.,  pp.   302-304. 
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carefully accumulated facts certain underlying laws in history which 
would both explain past events and enable the historian to predict 
21 
future developments.   Almost from the time of their introduction into 
the field of American historiography until the present, these two ideas 
have been followed, criticized, challenged, rejected, and restored with 
successive swings of the pendulum. 
The intellectual activity and discussion evoked by these ideas 
has stimulated a more thorough study and constant re-examination of 
history itself a6 an organized body of knowledge and as a discipline. 
Manifestly, everything that has ever been said, thought, done, or 
22 
happened to man,  is  history. And,  of course,  even if it were  possible 
to determine and evaluate all these  facts, the  bulk of the material would 
be  of little  interest and value  in the  recorded history  of man.     History 
as a body of knowledge,  therefore,   has  been delimited by the  selection 
of those  facts which the historian deemed interesting or useful. 
For centuries,  histories were written either to  give pleasure 
to readers  or to teach one  or more  "lessons".     In these  circumstances, 
facts were  selected because they were interesting,  curious,  or perhaps 
memorable;   or,   they were selected to support  a  cause  or theory which 
21. Henry  Johnson, Teaching of History   (Rev.  ed.j   New York: 
The Hacmillan Company,  1940),  pp.   12-13. 
22. James Harvey  Robinson,  The New History  (New York:   The 
Macmillan Company,   1912),  p.   1. 
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seemed  fundamental to the historian. Such methods  of selection, 
of  course,  would tend to distort the true picture  of any past 
occurrence.    The nineteenth-century scientific historians who 
attacked the  old didactic and story-telling procedure attempted to 
correct  these perversions by  employing only those  facts  which could 
be tested  for truth. 
But this  course  led to other complications.    Only  certain 
facts  — and a very few of them — can be established  by experiment 
and direct  observation.    Unfortunately,  most  of the  facts  of history 
can be  learned only  indirectly from records,  documents,  and artifacts 
which have  survived.    Those  sources  can never be  complete;  nor,  in the 
case  of written  records,  can the mind and times  of the writer be 
delineated with certitude.    The  importance and reliability attached to 
almost all the  facts  of history, therefore,  depend upon the historian's 
point  of view,  his training,  and his  background.     These  factors  are 
inevitably  bound to those of his  generation  and environment,  just  as 
the  "source" writers  of the past  reflect  their own Zeitgeist.     In 
addition,  the  historian must  perforce fill in the  omissions and gaps 
23.     Johnson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  10;   16-18. 
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in his facts.  He can do this only by adduction from other facts — 
at best, a good guess; and here again the personal predilections of 
24 
the historian are the primary components in his speculation. 
Hand in hand with the problems of determining facts is the 
question of what the historian is to do with them when he has 
accumulated and evaluated them. The nineteenth century writers gave 
two answers to this question. One was merely to narrate the facts 
objectively, letting the reader infer what he would or could. From 
this viewpoint, the political activities of man were regarded as most 
significant in his life and history. As a result, his social and 
economic relations were almost completely ignored, and such human 
attributes as ideals, aspirations, and creativeness, had no place 
26 
in history.   Once again the very narrow view of history as past 
politics only led to distortion — not so much of the facts used, as 
of the representation of man himself. And again, though more subtly, 
the historians, attempting to realize the ideal of objectivity, seemed 
as much as their predecessors to respond to the prevailing temper of 
their age. 
24. Ibid., p. 20. 
25. "Conclusions and Kecommendations of the Commission," Report 
of the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical 
Association (New York* Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 9. 
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In the  light  of the nineteenth-century  belief in the analogy 
of history and natural science,  it  is not  surprising that  the  other 
answer to the question of purposeful use  of accumulated facts was the 
prediction of future events  based upon acquired knowledge  of the  laws 
of causation.    To this purpose  historians  set  for themselves  the 
overwhelming task of determining fundamental  causes  and results  of 
human activity  in the mass.    This  idea was  soon criticized by scholars 
who  recognized the  complexity of history and the difficulty of 
determining even the private motives of one  individual with any degree 
26 
of finality. Furthermore,  implicit  in this  notion is the  idea that 
history  repeats  itself;   but,  ironically enough,  critical scholars 
following the methods  of science  have proved that, while events may bo 
similar,   no two have  ever been identical,   since the  surrounding conditions 
of an event tend to determine  it;  while,  of course,  the milieu is  always 
in a state  of change. 
Therefore,   since  change  is  the  fundamental  fact of history, 
27 
development  seems to be the  ruling idea in modern historiography. 
Actually,  the  developmental idea of history  — that  is, as a process  of 
26. George Kacaulay Trevelyan,  Clio, A liusa  (London*   Longman's, 
Green and Co.,   1930),  p.   147. 
27. Johnson,  op.   cit., p.  9. 
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continuous change  in which everything has  antecedents and consequences  — 
does  partake  of the  scientific  dogma of the  nineteenth century,  in that 
28 
it  recognizes   laws  of change and  of continuity with the past. From 
this  point of view,  history is a  chain of events;  and the historian is 
obligated to select  those  facts which truly  represent  or explain the 
29 
process   — and not necessarily progress  --  of human development. 
Explaining the process  of development  involves  interpretation 
and generalization by the  historian.    The  more  recent  historians, 
recognizing the  impossibility of complete  objectivity,  have  tended to 
write  so-called  "subjective"  histories.     Followers  of this  school 
generally adopt  definite  hypotheses  and select and organize their 
30 
material  around the  central theme,       but,   in keeping with the  scientific 
ideal,  they usually offer a  clear-cut  statement  of their theses;   and by 
this procedure  this  group  comes  closer,  in a sense,  to the techniques  of 
experimental science than many of the  avowedly scientific  historians, 
for the  historian as  a human being is probably the most variable  factor 
in historiography.    By acknowledging and attempting to control this 
28. Edward P.  Cheney,   "Law in History," American Historical Review, 
XXIX  (January,   1929),  pp.  235-237. 
29. Johnson,  op.   cit.,  p.   10. 
30. Kraus,  op.   cit.,  p.  453. 
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variable,  the  subjective historians may have  succeeded,   in the  long 
run,   in making their facts more  constant. 
In some  degree,  the  developmental  concept  of history also 
has  didactic  overtones.     In a  secular age,  historians   rarely try to 
inject moral  lessons  into their histories;  but the  body of knowledge 
that  constitutes  history is   regarded by most  of them as  a tool  for 
solving social problems and  judging and guiding political action. 
Because powers of  government  derive ultimately  from the people,  either 
actually in the  case of democracies  or by tacit approval  under 
dictatorships,  it  seems  essential, to historical writers  at  least, 
that  public opinion be  informed not only about  current  problems  but 
also about the forces and events which  created them.     It  is hoped, 
therefore, that  an understanding of past  social,  political,  and economic 
institutions will   lead to more  critical  judgment  of present problems 
31 
and make them intelligible. 
The influence of the idea of applying scientific methods to 
historical study and writing was not especially noticeable in American 
31. Frederic Harrison, The loaning of History (London: y.acmillan 
and Co., Limited, 1921), p. 20. 
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historiography until about  1900.    At that  time,  almost the  only 
subject  on which there was  substantial agreement was that the 
Civil War had been the pre-eminent  event  of American history. 
Since  the  South had been too greatly  occupied with other problems 
to produce much historical writing,  the majority  of historians 
32 
accepted the  orthodox Northern interpretation. But,  the 
nationalising spirit and approach at  this time  did produce  some 
significant  changes  in the  treatment  of the  Civil War theme.     Less 
influenced than others  by  sectional  differences,  historians  living 
and writing in the Middle Atlantic  states  tended to write  histories 
33 
which were  increasingly national in scope. 
Of this  group,  John Bach McJ-'aster is the most  important 
contributor to the  development  of American historiography.    A 
younger contemporary of Schouler and  Rhodes,  McMaster,   like them, 
held strong anti-slavery views.    But,  unlike them,  he  felt that 
political activities were not the  only theme worthy of the historian's 
pen;   and he  believed that  it was possible to write  a history  of the 
American people apart  from the history of the  United States  as a 
32. Ramsdell,   op.   cit., p.  11. 
33. Olllinger Crenshaw,  "Urban and  Rural Voting in the Election 
of I860," Historiography and Urbanization,  ed.   by Eric F.  Goldman 
(Baltimore:  The   Johns Hopkins Press,   1941),  pp.  215-217. 
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political entity.     In his History  of the People  of the  United States, 
published in eight volumes,  beginning in 1883,  he  gave as  much space 
to the South as to New England,  emphasized the part played by the West 
in American history,  and stressed the economic and social  aspects  of 
life.    Finally,  he  introduced the  extensive  use  of newspapers  and 
34 
pamphlets   in American historiography. 
McMaster's method of merely  reporting events  from day to  day 
or month to month,  unbiased though it might  have  been,  has  been 
discarded now,  but  his  emphasis upon the  importance of the  common man 
and his  extension of the  boundaries  of historical  inquiry  led Albert 
B.  Hart to call Moliaster "the  founder of the modern school  of historians 
35 
of the  United States". 
Woodrow Wilson was another member of this  group of writers 
tempered by the more neutral  environment  of the Middle Atlantic states. 
His Division and Reunion appeared in 1893;  and as  a college  text,   it was 
a noteworthy publication at  this time  because   it was  relatively unbiased. 
As  a native Virginian, Wilson believed that  the South was  right  in theory, 
but wrong in history;   but as  a trained historian,  he presented an unusually 
36 
fair account  of the  Northern position and of Northern leaders. 
34. William T.  Hutchinson,   "John Bach McMaster,"  Jernegan Essays, 
pp.  139-143 passim. 
35. Albert B.  Hart,  "The Writing of American History," Current 
History,  XXXIII  (March,   1931),   859. 
36. Louis Martin Sears,   "Woodrow Wilson,"  Jernegan Essays,  pp.   109-110. 
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More and more literature sympathetic to the Southern cause 
appeared after 1900 as graduate sohools were established and expanded. 
Many of the students undergoing training in scientific methods were 
Southerners who were interested in studying their own section. During 
the process of searching for facts, great quantities of forgotten 
records, newspapers, and documents were uncovered furnishing proof 
that many suppositions of the older historians were faulty because of 
37 
inaccurate or insufficient information. 
Spadework in Southern history was done at the new seat of 
higher learning. The Johns Hopkins University. At other universities, 
men like William A. Dunning, John Spencer Bassett, and William E. Dodd 
devoted themselves to Southern history and through their teaching 
38 
trained an excellent  group  of scholars who carried on their work. 
The time was  now ripe  for revised interpretations  of all phases 
of Southern history and particularly the period of the Civil War.    The 
tension of passionate  feeling was  being lessened;  many of the problems 
posed  by Reconstruction had been solved;   and newer information became 
increasingly available.    One  of the most  important  of the  new sources 
37. Ramsdell,  op.   cit., pp.   12-13. 
38. Kraus,   op.  cit.,  pp.  533-534. 
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was the Official Records of the War of The Rebellion. Thia monumental 
series of Confederate and Union army records was published under the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary of War and was authorized by act of 
Congress in June, 1874. The one hundred thirty volumes are divided 
into four series which include formal reports of military operations, 
general orders relating to prisoners of war, and annual and special 
reports of chiefs of staff of the corps and departments of both 
39 
armies.   Invaluable as these formal records are for historians of 
the period, the informal correspondence — letters and telegrams — 
exchanged among military leaders and National and state authorities 
have provided a wealth of new material for students interested in 
dispelling the old myths about such matters as loyalty and devotion 
to the Southern cause, cooperation among the state and National 
leaders, and conditions and treatment in both Northern and Southern 
prisons. 
Among the  first  of the Southerners who  rewrote Southern 
history was  Ulrich B.   Phillips,  a  student  of William A.  Dunning.     His 
Life and Labor in the  Old South  is  regarded by  one  critic as  "perhaps 
39.    War  of The  Rebellion;.. .Official  Records  of the  Union and 
Confederate Armies   (Washington,  D.  C.s   Government Printing Office, 
1880-1901),  preface  passim. 
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40 
the  best  book yet published on the  South as a whole". After careful 
examination of plantation records and other related documents,  Phillips 
concluded that  slaves were  generally not mistreated as  the  abolitionists 
had  charged.    All  humanitarian  considerations aside,  Negroes  were too 
41 
valuable economically to  be  seriously abused. He also pointed out 
that  the majority of Southern people  owned no slaves at  all,  and were 
therefore  far  less  concerned about property  rights  than about the  racial 
42 
and social problems which emancipation would create. 
Another revisionist, Dwight R. Dumond, demonstrated that although 
Southern leaders were justified in believing that the South was in real 
danger from the free states, they faced great difficulties in uniting the 
43 
section on a course of action.   Advancing a new trend in historical 
interpretations, Charles and Mary Beard in their Rise of American 
Civilization have explained the Civil War in economic terms: differences 
in "class arrangements", accumulation and distribution of wealth", and 
44 
changes  "in the  course  of industrial development". Meanwhile, within 
40. Kraus,   op.   oit.,  p.  541. 
41. Ramsdell,  op.   oit.,  p.   13. 
42. Ulrich B.  Phillips,  "Central Theme  in Southern History," 
American Historical Review,  XXXIV   (October,   1928),  pp.  30-43 passim. 
43. Ramsdell,  op.   cit.,  p.   14. 
44. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American 
Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), II, 53. 
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the past twenty years, Gilbert  Ji.  Barnes  and Dwight  L.  Dumond have 
made an outstanding  contribution to the historical literature of the 
abolition  crusade.     In their analysis  of the  campaign,  they have 
placed the  activities of the abolition societies within the  framework 
of the  larger humanitarian movement which had developed in the United 
States  during the eighteen-thirties.    These  revisionists have  carefully 
distinguished the  group of  radical abolitionists   from the more moderate 
reformers and have exploded the theory that  William Lloyd Garrison was 
the  source  and inspiration for all abolitionist  activity.    Barnes  and 
Dumond have  concluded instead that the work of the moderate  abolitionists 
was more  significant  in arousing anti-slavery  sentiments, and they have 
pointed out  the  hitherto almost unknown Theodore Dwight Weld as the most 
45 
influential  figure  in the American abolition movement. 
Several  other historians  during the nineteen-twenties and 
thirties  have made special studies  of several aspects  of the  Civil War 
which had been previously neglected.     In approaching the problem of 
leadership for example,  Philip G.  Auchampaugh,   in his  Janes  Buchanan 
and His  Cabinet,  has  succeeded in his  "attempt to  give  a fairer and 
45.    Gilbert  H.  Barnes  and Dwight  L.  Dumond,   "Introduction," 
Letters  of Theodore Dwight Weld, Angelina Grimke' Weld,  and Sarah 
Grimke,   1822-1844   (New York:   D. Appleton-Century  Company,  Inc.,   1934), 
p.  xix. 
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more  sympathetic account  of President Buchanan and his Administration 
46 
than is  usually available to the  general  historian." Similarly, 
Ella Lonn has  investigated the problem of  desertion in the  Union and 
Confederate  armies  during the war and has  exploded many of the myths 
of the  loyalty and devotion of Northern and Southern soldiers.     It  is 
now apparent that  desertion was  so extensive that  it was  regarded as 
one  of the major problems  in the  conduct  of the war and an important 
47 
contributory  factor  in the  failure  of the  Confederacy. In his 
excellent  treatment  of the  subject of Civil War prisons, William B. 
Hesseltine has  presented fresh evidence  on the  questions  of the 
exchange  of prisoners,  the  feeding and care of prisoners,  and actual 
prison  conditions  in both the  North and South.    As  a  result  of the 
work  of this  revisionist,  most  of the older broad generalisations 
based upon stories  of atrocities have  been  rejected,  and the whole 
subject  is  regarded now as  one  of the more  complex phases  of the war. 
Probably the most  noteworthy of the latest  contributions  toward 
a better understanding of the  causes  for the Civil War has  been fostered 
ty a  greater attention to psychological considerations.    According to 
48 
46. Philip G.  Auchampaugh,   James Buohanan and His  Cabinet 
(n.p.,   1926),  p.  v. 
47. Ella Lonn,  Desertion During the Civil War  (New York: 
The  Century Co.,   1928),  pp.  v-vi. 
48. Hesseltine,   op.  clt., p. viii. 
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James  C.   Randall,  the  cause  of the war can be  stated  in a word — 
"fanaticism".     Unfortunately,  the emotional  instability of the period 
was made  potentially more dangerous  by the  lack of real statesmen in 
49 
government. Avery Craven also stresses  emotionalism as a major 
50 
cause  — perhaps the  fundamental  cause  of the  conflict. From this 
point  of view,  the  Civil War was not  at all  inevitable;   and the term, 
"irrepressible  conflict",  coined by William H.  Seward and since  his 
day widely used by historians,  is  patently unsuitable. 
Like Craven and  Randall, most  of the  latter-day  revisionists 
at work on the   reinterpretation of the  Civil Viar have  concerned 
themselves with its  causal antecedents.     Some,  of course,  have addressed 
themselves  to the war itself.     Interestingly enough,  a considerable 
amount  of work  in revising Southern history  has been  done  in Southern 
universities  by  Southern historians.    Whether or not this  fact  betokens 
a  recognized need for critical self-examination on the part of the South, 
or simply an impulse toward "turn-about  is  fair play" after years  of 
Northern domination is  a moot  question.     In any  case,  the present 
rewriting of American history  is  indisputable proof of progress  in the 
historian's  craftmanship. 
49. James  G.   Randall,   "The Blundering Generation," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review,  XXVII  (June,   1940),  3. 
50. Avery  Craven, The Coming of the Civil War  (New Yorki   Charles 
Soribner's  Sons,   1942), p.  30. 
II 
CHANGES  IN INTERPfiETATIOiNS 
OF THE  CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 
The three  generations  of historians who have written histories 
of the Civil War have  distinguished causes which  range  from one  simple 
phenomenon to  complex patterns that  include all the  important 
intellectual,  political,  social,  and economic  developments  in America 
prior to  1861.    At  different  times,  and  in different  places,  they have 
cited conspiracy and human wickedness,   constitutional  developments, 
economic  interests,  political ambition,  "irrepressible  conflict", 
emotion,   cultural differences,   chance,  and high moral principles as 
forces which brought  on the war. 
Perhaps the  earliest  and most persistent  explanation of all 
the  causes  of the  Civil War is  slavery.    As  it was  first  formulated, 
the  slavery thesis was  stated in ethical terms.    The  Civil War was  an 
inevitable moral  conflict  between right,  that  is,  freedom, and wrong, 
or slavery.    This theme,  as may  be  expected,   originated with the 
Northern historians.     For Rhodes,  "...slavery was the   cause  of the war 
1.     Howard K.  Beale,  "What  Historians Have  Said About the Causes 
of the Civil War," Theory and Practice  in Historical Study: A  Report 
of the  Committee  on Historiography  (New York:   Social  Science  Research 
Council,   1946),  pp.  55-56. 
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betwoen the States.    Slavery  could not bear examination.     To describe 
2 
it was to condemn it."       Schouler was  considerably more violent  in his 
denunciation of the institution and of the  people who obstructed 
national progress. 
And nothing, moreover as  events went  on,  but the  downfall 
and destruction of the whole pernicious  system which was 
at the  root  of all  the  great troubles  of the  century, 
and obstructed the  destiny and growth of the American 
people  in homogeneous grandeur,  would have made  the  Union 
worth sustaining the  long,   costly,  and  calamitous  strife, 
or kept the  North constant to bear it  through. 
Here was  righteous  indignation  combined with the  prevailing spirit  of 
nationalism. 
These historians  of the nationalist  school were,  of course, 
sincerely  convinced of the veracity of their theory that  slavery as a 
moral  issue was the single,  immediate,  and underlying cause  of the war. 
It   is  interesting,  however,  that a Southerner,  writing on this  subject 
in 1864,  anticipated the more   recent  procedure  of attempting to separate 
immediate from underlying causes. 
2. James  Ford Rhodes,  History of the  United States   (New Yorkt 
The Macmillan Company,   1913),   I,  63;  VI,  27. 
3. James Schouler,  History of the  United States  of America 
(New York:  Dodd,  Mead <fc Company,  1894), V,  511. 
• 
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The cause does not lie so near the surface as is 
generally supp ssed. No doubt the immediate prove cation 
is  correctly assigned;   but  the  negro agitation is 
symptomatic merely,  and has  been the occasion,  not the 
cause,  of the war. 
While not  denying the  significance  of slavery as a  cause,  the 
new generation of historians  after World War I were  inclined to shift 
5 
their emphasis   from ethics  to economics.     Charles  and Mary Eeard 
popularized this view in that  brilliant  interpretation of our history, 
The  Rise of American Civilization.    According to the  economic 
interpretation,  the "peculiar institution" should be  regarded merely as 
a  labor system  — the  principal  system of labor in an outmoded agrarian 
6 
economy.       The  war,  so  runs the  argument, was  actually a  class  conflict 
between the  older  rural,  agrarian order and the  rising urban,   industrial 
7 
interests.       in these  circurrstances,  most  economic historians  find that 
"the  slavery issue, which toward the  last  overshadowed the  conflict,  was 
only  incidental until  dragged forth as a  camouflage  for more  fundamental 
8 
sectional  interests." 
4. C.  C  S.  Farrar,  The War Its  Causes and Consequences   (Cairo,   Ill.t 
blelock & Co.,   1864),  p.   7. 
5. Beale,   op.   cit.,  p.  63. 
6. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American 
Civilization (New York: The i.'acmillan Company, 1927), I, 36. 
7. Craven, op. cit., p. 43. 
8. Fred A.  Shannon, America's Economic Growth  (New York:   The 
Macmillan Company,   1940),  p.  300. 
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Thia revised interpretation, which ignored the moral 
implications of slavery, was in turn challenged in the nineteen- 
thirties by Gilbert H. Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond.  As a result of 
their study of the abolition crusade as but a segment of the larger 
religious and humanitarian movement of the period, not, as the older 
accounts had it, as a self-oontained movement, captained by Garrison 
and deploying out from a New England foous, Barnes and Dumond conoluded 
that the moral issue of slavery was a genuinely significant foroe 
9 
in bringing on the war. 
The eoonomic interpretation was further qualified by James G. 
Randall, but this time the challenge was presented within the framework 
of economio developments. Aocording to Randall, although "the stretch 
and span of oonscious economic motive was much smaller than the areas 
or olasses of war involvement", eoonomic diversity might just as well 
have inspired unity as conflict.  The now acknowledged interdependence 
of agrarian and industrialised sections should have created harmony; but, 
unfortunately, rivalry developed because of emotional tensions oreated 
and inflamed by abolitionist propaganda and the extremism of politicians 
10 
in quest of votes. 
9. Beale, op. oit., p. 63. 
10.     Randall,   op.   cit., pp.   9-10;   Idem.  The Civil War and Recon- 
struotion  (Boston: D. C.   Heath and Company,  1937),  Chaps,   iv-vi passim. 
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However,   regardless  of the   current  crop of revisions  of the 
slavery thesis,  almost all historians now have admitted the  complexity 
of the  issues  involved and have  ceased to fix upon slavery as  the  sole 
cause  of the war. 
Most historians  have agreed also that  the western migrations 
during the  eighteen-forties  and -fifties  precipitated most  of the 
11 
crises  in the  sectional dispute. Southern  leaders  did consistently 
ob.jeot to any proposal to exclude slavery from United States territories 
or states to be  created from them,   even  in  regions whore,  because  of 
geographical  factors,  the  slavery system would never have entered even 
if there  had been no  legal impediments.     The  reasons  for this  objection 
have not yet  been fully explained,  although an earlier I»'ew England 
historian characteristically accounted  for it   in the  usual terms of 
12 
wicked conspiracy of slaveowners. Actually,  almost all the earlier 
writers  had agreed with the  famous  dictum in Lincoln's   'House Divided 
Speech'  that the  government  could not have permanently endured   'half 
slave and half free'   and that  it was  fated to become at  last   'all  one 
thing,  or all the  other'.     Recently,   however,  historians  interested in 
11. Beale,  op.   cit.,  p.  64. 
12. Edward Channing, A History  of the  United States   (New York: 
The llacmillan Company,  1926), VI,  152. 
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the  geography and agricultural problems of the West  have  concluded 
that   it would have  been impossible to establish the  plantation system 
further west  than the limits  it  had already  reached — the  easternmost 
portion of Texas.    The Kansas and Nebraska territory was  equally unsuitod 
to cotton  farming or sugar growing.     In fact, the  Census  of 1860  revealed 
13 
only two slaves  in Kansas  and fifteen in Nebraska. in other words, 
"...by  1860 the  institution of slavery had virtually  reached its natural 
frontiers  in the west.    There was,  in brief,  no  further place for it to 
14 
go".   It is interesting to note that Daniel Webster, fully a decade 
before the war came, struck hard to hammer home this point in his 
celebrated 'Seventh of March Speech' on the floor of the Senate when 
that body was considering the compromise proposals of Stephen A. Douglas 
and Henry Clay.  It is significant, too, that Jefferson Davis noted that 
the climatic conditions which long before had caused the transfer of 
slaves from the Northeast to the South would have barred any permanent 
15 
establishment  of the  institution in most  of the western areas. 
13. Charles W.   Ramsdell,  "The Natural  Limits  of Slavery Expansion," 
Mississippi Valley Historical  Review,  XVI   (September,  1929),  pp.   156-162  passim. 
14. Ibid.,  pp.   163-164.     Ramsdell  believes  that  in the  case  of the 
Kansas-Nebraska  controversy  "though many of them ^The  Southerners/ doubted 
whether slavery would ever take permanent  root  in Kansas,  they feared to 
yield a  legal precedent which could later be  used against them." 
15. Davis,  op.   cit.,  p.   11 
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The conspiracy hypothesis, it would appear, does not suffice to 
aooount for the continued Southern resistance to all attempts to limit 
the boundaries of slavery.  Historians who attribute all causes and 
events to a sort of psychosis or hyperemotionalism are not so bothered 
16 
by this question}    and it is entirely probable that, even if these faots 
had been well publicised long before 1860, the majority of people in both 
sections would have held tenaciously to what they believed to be right, 
particularly as tensions mounted. 
The importance of the abolitionist societies as agencies for 
arousing and stirring emotions having been recognised in recent years, 
considerable interest has developed in the men and women sponsoring these 
groups.  For decades, historians attributed the whole abolitionist 
movement to one man, William Lloyd Garrison; and, as a result, were 
fortunate in being able to note specifically the place and even the day 
17 
the movement began.   Only the hour and minute were lacking. Some modern 
historians still find that Garrison was one of the most important forces 
18 
working for the abolition of slavery.   Even historians with an economic 
16. Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American Democraoy (New York: 
The Maomillan Company, 1948), pp. 513-514. 
17. Rhodes, op. oit., p. 63. 
18. John H. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (New Yorkt Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1947), p. 241. 
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bent characterise Garrison as  "the  ohief moral energiser of a nation 
19 which vowed itself to total and instantaneous  emancipation." 
Garrison,  through his Liberator, was highly vocal,  not to say 
obstreperous;   but,   as a consequence  of the disoovery and study of some 
hitherto unexplored letters written by Theodore Dwight Weld,  the 
accumulated legends surrounding Garrison have   been somewhat dispelled. 
Among other things,   it now appears that Garrison's   reputation and his 
demands   for immediate emancipation ware a positive embarrassment to  the 
American Anti-Slavery Society.     His newspaper,  formerly felt to be as 
influential as Uncle Tom's  Cabin,  actually had few subscribers   in the 
North,   and many of these were northern negroes whose influence was   slight. 
The sheet was far less successful in winning converts in the North than 
in stirring up hatred in the  South,  where exchange oopies   regularly came 
to the  desks of newspaper editors.    After  careful consideration  of Weld's 
letters,   Gilbert H.  Barnes has concluded that,   although most of the 
agitation of the abolitionists was  accomplished by corps of obscure 
people moved by  religious and evangelioal   impulses,  actually the 
20 
greatest figure in the movement was Theodore Weld. 
19.    Broadus Mitchell and Louise P. Mitohell, Amerloan Eoonomlo 
History   (Boston and New York*  Houghton Mifflin Company,  1947),  p.  516. 
20*    Barnes and Dumond,  op.   oit.,  pp. viii-xix passim.     "...Weld 
did not originate and dominate the antislavery agitation,  as people a 
generation ago supposed William Lloyd Garrison to have done, still he 
was the movement's man of power,  the  greatest   individual factor  in its 
triumph." 
Wald's   leadership  in the movement was quiet  but  effective.     Ha 
established abolition centers   in tha  South and Wast,  personally converting 
prominent   leaders, holding meetings,  and lecturing wherever he  could* 
Meanwhile,  he guided the  organisation and work of the American Anti-Slavery 
Society as well as writing the three greatest traots published by that 
body.     One  of these.   Slavery As It  Is,  Harriet Beecher Stowe claimed to 
21 
have  used as the  basis  for her famous  book. 
Sinoe the publication of the Weld letters, the figure of Garrison 
as the abolition hero has shrunk considerably.     Incidentally, the reception 
accorded these volumes  by the  historical profession is an exoellent 
illustration of the earnest  desire to obtain as much accurate information 
as possible about people and events  of the past.     The  influenoe of Weld 
can no longer be  ignored by a conscientious historian;   and the  old pat 
and easy explanation of the abolition movement is no  longer acceptable. 
And,  despite the new complications for the historian, a reviewer for the 
official organ of the American Historical Association concludes that 
these  "...volumes constitute  one of the most important additions to our 
21.     Ibid.,  p.  xvii f. 
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kuowledge of the abolitionist movement that hue been made in many 
years," and that "one may expect to see these volumes frequently quoted 
in the future, for all who have occasion to deal with the slavery 
22 
controversy will have to take this evidence into aocount." 
If slavery was the most generally accepted causal agent in 
Northern interpretations of the origins of the Civil War among the 
first generation of historians, disputes over constitutional theory 
were the oause most frequently advanced by earlier Southern writers. 
From their point of view, while slavery might actually have been the 
catalyst that precipitated the explosion, fundamentally the South 
seoeded and fought to escape the consequenoes of what they considered 
an unconstitutional concentration of power in the Federal Governments 
That the control of that government, long held by the Democratic party 
(normally under the strong influence of Southerners and pro-Southern 
Northerners) was to be shifted, when Lincoln was inaugurated, to the 
Republicans, an avowedly sectional Northern party committed to a policy 
of slavery "containment," was an important consideration bound up with 
23 
22. Fred Landon,  Review of the Letters of Theodore Dwight Weld, 
Angelina GrlW Weld and Sarah Grlmke',  1822-1844 by Gilbert H. Barnes 
and Dwight L. Dumond, American Historical  Review XXXX1   (October,   1935), 
p.   164. 
23. Beale,   op.  oit., pp.   61-62. 
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th* Southern opposition to federal aggrandizement, but that aspect of the 
dialectic was, naturally, not stressed.  As might be expected, Jefferson 
Davis carefully spelled out the doctrine of states rights, drawing a 
parallel between the position of the Southern states in 1861 and the 
British colonies in America in 1776 and 1789. 
After a time the Constitution was ratified by eleven States, 
and the "more perfeot Union" was organized, leaving two 
States—North Carolina and Hhode Island—sole representatives 
of the Confederation which had raised the Colonies to 
statehood and independence. The position of these two 
States conclusively proves that the sovereignty of eaoh 
State was an admitted faot, and that it was a voluntary 
compact to which their assent was requested and from which 
it was withheld.24 
Constitutional issues continued to be stressed until about 1900, 
even by Northern historians. This doctrine was, moreover, widely 
disseminated in popular histories of the period.  John Eidpath, who wrote 
popular aocounts of the type that enjoyed a long vogue as a standard 
household appurtenance, insisted that the first and most general oause 
of the conflict was "...the different construction put upon the national 
Constitution by the people of the North and South." 
24. Davis, op. cit., p. 5. 
25. John Clark Ridpath, A Popular History of the United States of 
America (New Yorki Phillips A Hunt, 1888), pp. 486-489. It is interesting 
that Eidpath anticipated recent economic interpretations of the slave 
issue when he cited as a second cause the "different system of labor in 
the North and South." 
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26 
Among the earlier professional historian*, John W. Burgess 
presented the most outstanding refutation of the Southern argument. 
He argued that the doctrine of state sovereignty under the compact 
theory of government was both oontrary to oanons of Republican 
political philosophy and an unsound constitutional interpretation 
Later historians, influenced by economic interpretations, have 
regarded the states rights dootrine simply as a defense brought 
forward by an agrarian sooiety contending for supremacy with new 
urban-industrial groups.  Before the slavery issue was introduced 
into the picture, the conflict was basically a "nation-wide class 
. 27 
struggle". 
Probably the final word on the subject  of differing 
constitutional theories as a cause  of the Civil Vfer has been said by 
Arthur M.  Sohleslnger.     In his essay "The  States Rights  Fetish",  he 
pointed out the fact that the dootrine was  an old shibboleth which had 
been used again and again in many eras  in American history,  and that 
even the expression itself had had different meanings  in different 
26. Beale,   op.   olt.,  p.   62. 
27. Avery Craven,  The Represelble Conflict 1830-1861   (Universityt 
Louisiana State University Press,  1939), p.  73. 
-40- 
28 
periods or among different leaden in the same period,  "...almost every 
state in the Union has declared its own sovereignty and denounced as 
almost treasonable similar declarations in other oases by other states." 
In 1845, the legislature of Massachusetts refused to acknowledge the aot 
admitting Texas into the Unionj and again, in 1847, the legislature of the 
same state declared the Mexican War unconstitutional.  The numerous 
Personal Liberty Laws passed after 1850 by individual state legislatures 
in the North to counteract the Federal Fugitive Slave Act are further 
illustrations of the divergent uses found for this convenient theory. 
The last fling with the idea taken by any Northern legislature before 
the war came from Wisconsin in 1859.  That state legislature passed a 
resolution to the effect that " 'sovereign and independent* " states 
had formed the Union and therefore they had the right to resort to 
" 'positive defiance' " of acts of the Federal government which they 
29 
considered illegal.   Schlesinger concluded, therefore, that, although 
the states rights doctrine did see its major development in the South, 
it is necessary to treat the idea in the light of its own time and 
ciroumstanoes in order to arrive at a proper understanding of any 
controversy on the subject.   Devotion to the principle of majority 
28. Arthur M. Schlesinger, "The State Rights Fetish," New 
Viewpoints In American History (New Yorkt The Maomillan Company, 1923), 
pp. 221-223. 
29. Ibid., pp. 230-231. 
30. Ibid., p. 243. 
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rule is notably weakened la the circles of aggrieved minorities. 
But rather than launoh a frontal attack upon the principle itself, 
the dissenters have time and again in the American past preferred a 
flank attaok by denying that the proposed policy which they are 
determined to forestall lies within the constitutional powers of the 
government whose jurisdiction they defy. 
No doubt Schlesinger, the historian, derived some amusement 
from the clear-cut illustration of his thesis during the campaign for 
the last Presidential election. Less amusing and more significant was 
the fairly general acceptance of the notion that the doctrine of states 
rights was an indigenous product of the South, originated during the 
Civil War and dug out and dusted off by Thurmond in 1948. 
One of the most comprehensive of all the single or complex 
explanations for the coming of the Civil War ever offered was what may 
be called the conspiracy theory. According to this theme, the war was 
caused by the fiendish, deliberate and calculating machinations of 
politicians, (either Northern or Southern, depending on the writer), 
abolitionists, slaveowners, bankers, clergymen, newspapermen — in other 
words, anyone and everyone who might have held an opinion of any kind 
31. 
on national affairs.   Almost the only group not mentioned and included 
31. Beale, op. olt., pp. 58-69. 
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in this  oategory was the military.     At least militarism was not a 
foroe to be   reckoned with in mid-nineteenth century America. 
This   "devil  theory" was an amazingly convenient   device,   for 
almost any event or aotivity by an individual or whole   group from 
1830 on oould be and was attributed to the wicked contriving of 
either Southerners  or Northerners.     This  theory was dominant in the 
years   closest to the war, when writers were  trying to lay blame  for 
the tragedy and reoriminations were hotly tossed from one  side of 
the Line to the  other.    These  oversimplified and emotional  interpre- 
tations  tended to disappear with the passage of time and advanoes in 
historical research and writing, and since the publication of Charles 
A. Beard's  essay The Devil Theory of War,  a conspiracy thesis will 
probably never again satisfy serious American historians  as an 
32 
explanation for any war.   According to Beard's analysis, the 
widespread conviction that evil men make war while the masses of 
people pursue peaceful interests is entirely fallacious, for politicians 
do not aot in a vacuum.  Rather, the majority of them oome from among 
35 
the people and are responsive to group or class interests.   War, says 
32. Bdwin C. Roiweno (ed.), "Slavery as a Cause of the Civil War," 
Problems in American Clvilif-tion (Boston. D. C Heath and Company, 1949), 
p. vi. 
33. Charles A. Beard, The Devil Theory of War (New York* The Vanguard 
Press, 1936), pp. 22-23. 
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Beard, "...canes out of ideas, interests, and activities cherished 
and followed in the preceding months and years of peace". And 
again, "war is not the woric of a demon.  It is our very own work, 
34 
for whioh we prepare, wittingly or not, in the ways of peace." 
Perhaps this is what produced the political ineptitude among the 
leaders of the "Blundering Generation". 
Despite the general amelioration of the sectional bitterness 
whioh had created "the devil theory", within the last ten years an 
isolated historian has presented an almost typical conspiracy 
interpretation of the war, presumably for the edification of modern 
students.  In attempting to provide "a general synthesis of causes", 
Frank R. Owsley attacked with surprising vehemence the earlier 
abolitionist attack on the South, stating that no one has "...as 
yet been able to plumb the depths of vulgarity and obsoenity 
reached...by...abolitionists of note."  Under such conditions, war 
was inevitable in 1860, for "...peace between sections as between 
nations is placed in jeopardy when one nation or one section fails to 
34. Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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respect the self-respect of another section or nation". 
35 
Will* Owelay Binglad out sectionalism, particularly the 
self-oentered attitude of the North, as the one basic cause of the 
confliot, other historians since World War I usually have included 
cultural, economic, and political differences between the North and 
South as possible facets of the impulse toward war. The powerful 
foroe of nationalism had been stirring in the United Statesj and, 
according to this interpretation, the South was either largely 
untouched by it, or the South assumed an extremely aggressive 
36 
nationalism peouliar to itself.   As Nathaniel W. Stephenson has 
pointed out, "...that such an idea /of sectional consciousness/ was 
somehow formed, that what may be called 'Southern Nationalism' was 
not so old as the Union but older than the Civil War, few students 
37 
today will have the rashness to deny." 
The problem then for the historian was to discover the 
reasons for these Northern and Southern differences.  The institution 
of slavery in the South was the most outstanding and obvious one; 
35. Frank L. Owslay, "The Fundamental Cause of the Civil Wart 
Egocentric Sectionalism," Journal of Southern History VII (February, 
1941), pp. 15-17. 
56. Beala, op. cit., pp. 65-66. 
37. Nathaniel W. Stephenson, "Southern Nationalism in South 
Carolina," American Historical Review XXXVI (January, 1931), p. 314. 
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and earlier historians,   convinced of the moral wrong of human 
bondage,  looked upon slavery as the   basis for the  differences  in 
societal organisation.     The Southern society was  based upon the 
production of staple agricultural crops by slave  labor;   on the 
other hand, Northern society was  developing a system of diversified 
38 
industrial activity carried on by wage  labor. Using this premise, 
they elaborated the   old   right-versus-wrong theme again  — this time 
in terms of an aristocratic way of life in  conflict with the 
democratic-republican tradition.     Recent historians seem to feel 
that the presence of the negro as an unassimilated foreign element 
in the population,  rather than the institution of slavery, was the 
fundamental  cause for sectional differences.     The  negroes,   furthermore, 
were unskilled laborers at the bottom of the   social ladder;   and most 
important  of all, they were considered a constant menace to the peace 
39 
and security of the South. For these reasons,  one outstanding 
historian has designated the South's pre-ocoupation with keeping the 
negro population under control the  "central theme  of Southern history". 
40 
38. Charming,   op.   oit.,  p.  3. 
39. Avery Craven,   The Repressible Conflict 1830-1861,  pp.   23-25. 
40. Phillips,  op.   oit., p.  43. 
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Some historians hay* offered as reasons for sectional 
differences such factors as Southern romantioism, contrasts in 
manners, in climate and in soil. Southern dependence on only one 
or two staple crops, and the backwardness and provincialism which 
41 
seem to be common to rural societies.   Others, with an economic 
bent, have found that "the economic inferiority of the South...was 
of overwhelming importance in bringing about the economic sectionalism 
42 
that led to secession and war between the states.";   and even 
though slavery should not be completely overlooked, "...in 1860, 
sectional animosity on economic differences other than slavery had 
„43 
reached a stage acute enough for secession. 
AM  pointed out berore, the latest group of revisionists do not 
feel that any of these sectional differences were intense enough or 
important enough to warrant war; and, in fact, economic sectionalism 
could have operated to produce greater acoord rather than division. 
At any rate, most of the principal differences had existed in other 
44 
times and places without causing war.   This has led some historians 
to turn to the political phases of the dispute in quest of the reasons 
for sectional controversy, and recent interpreters have found that 
41. Beale, op. clt., p4 67. 
42. Shannon, op. oit., p. 300. 
43. Harold 0. Faulkner, Amerloan Economic History (4th ed.j 
New York and Londoni Harper 4 Brothers Publishers, 1938), p. 378. 
44. Nichols, op. clt., p. 613. 
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political activity prior to the war was an important factor in the 
conflict.  Originally, the national parties had served to unify all 
sections. When the old national parties failed in their efforts to 
oope with national problems and the sectional Republican Party 
emerged to compete with older loyalties, national unity was no longer 
45 
possible,  and "war came when the American people for the first time 
refused to abide by a national election. The parties which had been 
promoting the cohesive attitudes had broken down, and their 
disorganization had permitted the new Republican organization to win 
_46 
through direct appeal to the devisive attitudes." 
This theme does seem to aooount for the immediate provocation 
of the war; most historians have credited the Republican victory in 
I860 as the immediate oause for secession; but, on the other hand, 
there had been splits in national parties before 1850, as there were 
to be later, without producing anything more serious than perhaps 
some localized, egg-tossing demonstrations. 
Many historians throughout the years have continued to searoh 
for the one factor or factors which might have caused the war and which 
45. Ibid., p. 517. 
46. Ibid., p. 516. 
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would still  stand in the   face of all the new evidence being 
offered on such matters,   for example,  as  sectional divisions within 
47 48 
individual states%        positive opposition to negroes  in the North, 
and exaggeration of the treatment  of negroes  in the South by the 
49 
abolitionists. in the  case of most of the older interpretations, 
historians,   consciously or unconsciously,   had aocepted at  least some 
of the earlier conventional beliefs in order to support their theses. 
But within the  last twenty years a new hypothesis has  been brought 
forward which has   been called a psychological interpretation.     This 
idea, whioh  is as   important a contribution to American historiography 
as  the older economic interpretation, was  developed principally by 
Avery 0.   Craven and James G.  Randall;  and it grew out  of their 
questioning of the theories concerning the   'irrepressibility'   of the 
war and the   factitious pretexts in the name  of which it was  invoked. 
Neither of them ignore any of the  various   oonflicts and seotlonal 
50 
differences previously offered to explain the war. Furthermore, 
47. Roger W.  Shugg,   Origins  of Class   Struggle  in Louisiana 
(University:   Louisiana State University Press,   1939),  pp.   157-168 passim. 
48. Charles   H. Wesley, Negro Labor  in the United States   1850-1925 
(New Yorlcj Vanguard Press, 1927), p.  83. 
49. Avery Craven,  The Represslble Conflict, p. 3. 
50. Beale.   op.  oit.,  p.   83.     See especially Randall, Civil War 
and Reconstruction, pp. vi-vii,  chap,  iv-ix passim, and Craven, Represslble 
Conflict,   and The  Coming of the Civil War- 
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thoir thesis apparently can encompass most of the now material which 
has tended to shatter older interpretations. What appears to be 
more important in the quest for the truth of the past, however, is 
the faot that they make an effort to aooount for the prevailing 
thought and attitudes of the Civil War period itself.  After all, 
most of the "new" information now being aired has been obtained 
from the contemporary literature of the era, and was available then, 
though perhaps not so conveniently, for rational use in averting war. 
Nonetheless, people, North and South, in mid-nineteenth century Amerioa, 
held beliefs, whioh, sinoe they were thought to be true, proved to be 
more important as determinants of attitudes and action than the truth 
51 
itself. 
These more reoent revisionists submit that the war came when 
the common beliefs were inflamed by emotion; and issues became inter- 
52 
mingled with hatred, pride, religious enthusiasm and other passions. 
As Craven puts it, "the Civil War was the product of emotions slowly 
intensified through the years, and not of natural factors inherent in 
_53 
the early sectionalism of either the North or South. 
■ 
51. William A. Dunning, "Truth in History," Amerioan Historical 
Review XIX (January,  1914), p. 19. 
52. Beale, op.  oit., p.  84. 
55. Avery Craven, The Represslble Conflict, p. 30. 
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Onoe again the introduction of a new interpretation has 
raised additional problems and questions for historians. When did 
the war psychosis develop, and what or who was responsible for itf 
Craven finds that "politicians used the moral fervor generated by 
abolitionists to enhance the sectional rivalry from 1830 to 1860." 
Since this formula may appear to smack too muoh of the conspiracy 
theme, Randall contents himself with the view that, although 
politicians were responsible for arousing feelings, emotionalism was 
really the result of a general lack of able leadership rather than of 
55 
deliberate political scheming. 
4 very reoent writer has provided still another explanation 
for what he calls "hyperemotionalism".  In addition to poor states- 
manship, the sheer number of eleotion oontests in the eighteen-fifties 
tended to stimulate constant agitation on all issues. Nichols 
maintains that the unusual number of political contests scheduled in 
one state or another every month of the year, save four, "aroused 
passion to such a pitch that only bloodletting, occasional or wholesale, 
could relieve the tension. 
The revisionists seem to agree that, beyond the point where 
54. Ibid.,  p.   62. 
55. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 145-148. 
56. Nichols,  op.   clt.,   pp.   5-6. 
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reaaon gave way to passion, the war was inevitable; but they 
appear to be convinced that prior to that point war could have 
been avoided. Within the past few months, however, a youthful 
historian has criticised the revisionists for their failure to 
particularize and clarify the forces which should have operated to 
forestall the conflict. Among other things, he feels that the 
revisionists have sidestepped the fundamental moral problems 
implicit in slavery, and "have resorted instead to broad 
. 59 
affirmations of faith". 
It is, of course, too soon to tell whether or not this 
attack presages a new development in American historiography — 
really a return to late nineteenth-oentury views of the funotion 
of history and the role of the historian.  One thing seems fairly 
certain — each generation has rewritten its own history in the 
pastj and succeeding generations of historians will, in all 
probability, oontinue to do so, incorporating in the prooess 
whatever ideas in historical interpretation are currently dominant. 
59. Arthur Sohlesinger, Jr. "The Causes of the Civil War. A 
Note on Historical Sentimentalism," Partisan Bsview (October, 1949), 
pp. 972-975. 
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CHANGES  IN INTERPRETATIONS OF CONDITIONS 
DURING THE  COURSE OF THE WAR 
In the   same manner in which  revisionists have  re-examined the 
origins of the   Civil War in the hope of  shedding light on the 
causation,   both  of war and of peace,  others have reconsidered some 
of the  conditions and events which occurred during the course of 
the war, also with the  hope that,  by revealing more  of the truth  of 
war — its ugliness and sordidness —, further steps might be made 
in the direction of peaoe.       One by one,  the  older and more romantic 
piotures of Northern and Southern eagerness for war and loyalty to 
a oause, made legendary in novels and ballads,  have  been redrawn and 
replaced by sounder and more acourate acoounts. 
For many years,   the  idea of unity within the  rival sections 
had been one of the more widely accepted generalisations  about the 
war.     Older writers,  overemphasising the Civil War as the most 
outstanding event in American history, tended to oreate an illusion 
of a close-knit, homogeneous "Solid South",  and an equally united 
Northern population feverishly engaged in defending either slavery 
1.    Lonn,  op»  oit», p. v« 
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or freedom.  Actually, "the assumption of unity Ignored a sharp 
division of opinion that had been constantly manifested through the 
2 
years of oonflict." 
Opinion in the North was divided on the subject of the negro 
and emancipation*  Northern laborers and farmers feared competition 
from free negroes» and as late as July, 1863, a doten negroes were 
lynched during the draft riots in New York.  Recent investigations 
have also led to the conclusion that, while many Northerners were 
ready to fight to restore the Union, few were willing to fight for 
3 
the abolition of slavery. 
Opinion in the North was divided also on the question of 
national or state sovereignty.  The majority of Northern citizens 
were not at all convinced in 1861 that the Federal Congress should 
take preoedenoe over the individual state legislatures.  Dunning 
pointed out as early as 1898 that "if a vote had been taken in this 
area at this time on the abstract question of constitutional inter- 
pretation, the President's opinion ^that the nation was supreme7 
4 
would probably have been defeated." 
2. Avery Craven, The Repressible Conflict, p. 3. 
3. Fred A. Shannon, The Organisation and Administration of 
the Union Army 1861-1865 (Clevelandi The Arthur H. Clark Company, 
1928), II, 145. 
4. William A. Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reoonstruotion 
(New York: The Maomillan Company, 1898), p. 12. 
It ia now clear too, aa a raault of freah inveatigatione, 
that,   in 1860,  Northern oapitaliata,   bankere,   and merchants were 
frightened by the  prospect   of Lincoln's eleotion,  and that election 
returns from urban voters   revealed a aurprisingly strong opposition 
to him*     Likewise   in the South,   city real estate owners, merohanta, 
and capitalists were opposed to the idea of disunion,   and the 
majority of urban votes were oast for the pro-Union,  moderate 
6 
candidates, Bell and Douglaa. 
Furthermore,   it now seems evident that there never waa 
absolute unity and agreement  in the South either.     Three fourtha 
of the 8outhernera   owned no  slavea at  all and many of them were 
6 
relatively uninterested in the institution.       In addition,  people 
living in the mountain regions or the so-called "up-country" seotions 
7 
of the South generally opposed secession.       However, under the 
preasure of attaok  from the North, the South apparently did develop 
a high degree of unanimity on this question.    Nonetheless,   there was 
sharp confliot in several individual Southern states during the 
eighteen-fifties between certain extremists who advocated immediate 
5*     Crenshaw,   op.   oit.,   pp.   49-54 paaalm. 
6*     Jamee 6.   Randall,   The Civil War and Eeoonatruotion,  pp.   61-62, 
7.    Prank L.  Owaley, "Defeatiam in the Confederacy," The North 
Carolina Hiatorlcal Review III   (July,   1926), p.  446. 
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secession and other more moderate men who urged delay until all the 
o 
Southern states could agree to aot together.       And,  it should be 
remembered that four of the  slave states   (Virginia, North Carolina, 
Tennessee,   and Arkansas)  did not secede until after the provisional 
Confederate Government had been formed and President Lincoln had 
called up Union volunteers  to resist   it,  and that four others 
(Delaware,  Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky)  never seceded at all. 
These  are only a few of the  internal  sectional conflicts 
which most  of the earlier historians  had ignored,  either because they 
lacked information or because the  facts would not have supported 
their hypotheses. 
But recent historians,   particularly those interested in 
effects of emotionalism and war psychosis,   usually have oonfirmed the 
older view that,  despite the  previous diohotomy of opinion,  enthusiasm 
for war was nearly unanimous  and was   impassioned in both sections 
in the  spring of 1861.     In the North,  Lincoln's  call for 75,000 
militia to serve for three months was met  immediately;   and many 
states were prepared to provide twice as many for two-year enlistments. 
In the South,   there was a similar,  almost  overwhelming,  rush to 
10 
volunteer for army service. 
8. Stephenson,   op.   cit., pp.   315-335 passim. 
9. Fred A. Shannon,  The  Organisation and Administration of the 
Union Army 1861-1866,   I,  31. 
10.    Bell  Irvin Wiley,   The Life  of Johnny Reb (Indianapolisi 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company,   1943),  p.   123. 
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Sinco these facts, at least on the surface, appear 
contradictory in the light of newer evidence on intraseotional 
disagreements, several recent historians have sought to find clues 
to the problem of the causes and effects of emotionalism in the 
reasons given by the average soldier for his participation in the 
war and in the causes for which he thought he was fighting. 
As a result of his study of letters and diaries written by 
common soldiers in the Confederate armies, Bell I. Wiley has 
concluded that, on the whole, soldiers were moved to enlist for 
many different reasons.  Unquestionably, many were motivated by 
an intense hatred of the North, because the majority of Southerners, 
both actual slaveholders and those who hoped to own slaves eventually, 
believed that the Northern attitude toward the institution was 
completely unreasonable. Many others volunteered in 1861 because 
enlistment was the ourrent fashion and social pressures were intense. 
For many others, particularly those from the lower social and economic 
classes, army service was regarded either as a great adventure or as 
a lark. At least there would be opportunity for travel and a chance 
to get away from the dullness of routine occupations. "  Many others. 
11.  Ibid., pp. 15-17. 
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of course, joined the army when they were thrown out of work as 
12 
trade and shipping came to a standstill following secession. 
Regardless of the fundamental grounds for enlistment, 
however, hatred of the Yankees was an emotion common to the 
majority of Southern soldiers, but the reasons for this feeling 
were varied.  Interestingly enough, few of the ordinary soldiers 
were disturbed by threatened violations of states rights or property 
13 
rights.   Rather, the Federal soldiers were hated because they 
were thought to be "an unsavory sort of people" who "made a fetish 
of money" and who were "tricky and deceitful" as well as brutal and 
cowardly.   And, as is usually the case when a very large number 
of people are lumped together for purposes of generalisation, it 
was possible to document the Southern viewpoint. 
Although no careful study of the reactions of Northern 
soldiers has been made, judging simply from the type of literature 
produced in the North immediately after the war, the feeling must 
have been mutual, and, as in the case of the South, diverse interests 
12. Shugg, op. oit., pp. 170-171. 
13. Wiley, op. clt., p. 309. Wiley believes that "it is 
doubtful whether many of them either understood or cared about the 
Constitutional issues at stake. The threat to slavery was resented 
rather widely, not so much as an unwarranted deprivation of property 
rights, but as a wedge for 'nigger equality'." 
14. Ibid., pp. 310-314. 
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also motivated Northern enlistments.  Shannon has found that 
The abolitionist would fight to free the slaves, the 
Kentuokian to save the Union so that slavery might 
be preserved.  The oapitalist would fight, by proxy, 
to preserve the Southern market and to exclude there- 
from the competition of foreign states.  The frontier 
states would fight to keep the far West negrolees and 
open for their settlement.  The older settlements 
west of the Alleghenies and north of the Ohio would 
fight, when at all, for sentiment or for various of 
the other mentioned motives.  The wage victims of the 
industrial revolution would fight, if at all, by 
compulsion or for pay.1" 
Other modern writers have found in these diverse public and 
private reasons for fighting at least a partial explanation for the 
gradual decline in enthusiasm which began almost immediately in both 
sections. By 1862, the pace of volunteering had slowed to such an 
extent that the Confederate government was oompelled to resort to 
conscription; and in 1863, the Federal Congress found it necessary 
16 
to enact the first of a series of draft laws.   Opposition to these 
measures in both sections apparently beoame more overt in inverse 
ratio to the decline in public morale.  Recent investigators have 
discovered that on both sides the poorer classes objeoted vigorously 
15. Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of 
the Union Army, I, 21. 
16. James 0. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 
354) 410. 
to the provisions   in these   laws which permitted the hiring of 
subatitutes.     In the South,   the  catch-phrase  "rioh man»a war, 
poor man'a   fight"  became  a popular slogan,  and this belief had a 
devastating effect upon civilian and army morale.     Indeed,  one 
recent  historian has  concluded that the  feeling aroused over 
favoritism toward the rich on the part  of the Confederate government 
was   "the most  fundamental and far-reaching cause of the  defeatism" 
whioh led eventually to the almost complete   collapse  of the 
17 
Confederacy at  the  close of the war. 
Another important  cause  for Southern failure was the 
appalling amount of desertion from the armies.     In a recent study 
of the whole problem,  based largely upon the  documents made available 
in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Ella Lonn has 
indicated that the heavy toll of desertion already had beoome 
apparent when Lee was forced to retire  from Maryland in the  fall 
of 1862.    By 1865,   deserters were oounted by the thousands as whole 
companies and even  regiments  departed without  leave.     Official figures 
indicate that at least 103,400 Confederate  soldiers deserted during 
the course  of the war   (the Articles  of War,  by the way,   defined the 
crime  as punishable  by death);   or, to put  it another way,   roughly one 
17.     Prank L.   Owsley,   "Defeatism in the  Confederacy",  loo,   oit., 
p.   450. 
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soldier in ten who entered the service later fled from the ranks* 
18 
Furthermore, desertion seems to have been prevalent among all ranks, 
19 
social classes, and areas of the Confederacy.   In view of this new 
evidence, it would appear that there is no cause so sacred (even if 
it is thoroughly understood) that will sustain the average human 
being through the trials of homesickness and general war weariness. 
It is now evident that the Northern forces were no more 
immune to the problem of desertion than the Southern armies.  Actually, 
a clear parallel has been drawn between the extent of desertion and 
20 
the causes for it in both sections.   Although the records are 
inaccurate and incomplete, apparently about 5,500 soldiers deserted 
21 
each month from the Union armies between 1863 and 1865.   In 
addition, many of the men, eager to colleot the bounties offered by 
Federal, State, and local governments, deserted repeatedly and traded 
22 
professionally in enlistment and desertion. 
None of these factors is very attractivej and, of course, 
none of them appeared in the earlier romanticised versions of the 
war.  From the Northern point of view, of course, the war was won by 
18. Lonn,   op. oit.,  pp.   120,   124,   231. 
19. Ibid., p. 123. 
20. Ibid., p. 143. 
21. Ibid.,  p. 162. 
22. Ibid.,  p. 139. 
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gallant and heroic men fighting for a very righteous cause. 
Naturally, Southern writers explained that, although the South had 
been defeated, even more gallant and heroio men had magnificently 
defended a holy cause against overwhelming odds. 
Later writers, while they have conceded the very real 
courage evidenced by men on.both sides, have oited other causes to 
account for the Confederate failure in 1865.  As a matter of faot, 
Charles A. Wesley has concluded that the Confederacy was not actually 
defeated, but rather collapsed from complex internal causes.  Among 
these causes were army desertions, demoralization of civilian morale, 
and poor facilities for transporting both the troops and the actually 
abundant food resources. At the governmental level, the lack of 
cooperation and personal quarrels between the President and Vice 
President on the one hand, and between the Riohmond government and 
individual state governments on the other — quarrels which, in their 
post-war publio airing, served to obscure the real issues, were 
additional elements contributing to the collapse.  The doctrine of 
states rights — the very oause for which the South was ostensibly 
fighting — turned on the central government and helped to bring on 
the disaster. But, despite all the complex elements involved in the 
collapse, Wesley, in the current vogue of psychological interpretations. 
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has concluded finally that "of the factore contributing to this 
collapse, the psychological factor of morale was one of the most 
23 
influential in the complex scene." 
Still another important aspect of the Civil War has under- 
gone considerable revision in reoent years.  For a long time, the 
truth about Northern and Southern prison conditions and treatment 
of prisoners was clouded by the atrocity stories and other types 
of propaganda current during the war, and by the flood of diaries 
and personal memoirs published after 1865.  Once again, the documents 
published in the Offloial Records of the War of the Rebellion have 
been the principal source for the new material with which historians 
have refuted the older fictions. 
Of course, the first generation of historians, writing only 
in terms of black and white, presented, at their best, one-sided 
pictures of the conditions in Civil War prisons, and at their worst, 
essays of vituperation and reorimination. According to these versions. 
Southern prisoners in the North were treated humanely, even kindly, 
at all times; while in the South, prisoners received harsh and even 
23.  Charles H. Wesley, The Collapse of the Confederacy 
(Washington, D.C.« The Associated Publishers, Inc., 1937), 
pp. 168-171 and passim. 
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barbarous treatment.     Furthermore,  all Southern prisons were 
infested with filth and disease, whereas Northern prisons were 
built and maintained  "with due   regard to health and sanitary 
conditions." Naturally,  Southern writers made  similar assertions 
25 
and accusations  in their own behalf* 
Once  again,  recent   investigators have disproved such 
sweeping generalisations.     In his book on Civil War prisons, 
William B.  Hesseltine has  decided that  neither   side was   in a 
position to blame the  other, for prisons,  both North and South, 
were overcrowded,  filthy,   and overrun with vermin.    Bach section 
was  guilty of bungling and mismanagement,   and there was much 
suffering and misery in almost all of the prisons,  regardless  of 
locale. 
Apparently conditions in Southern prisons grew worse as  the 
war progressed.     Food of any kind beoame increasingly soaroe,   and 
supply became  an aoute problem as  battle lines  drew closer to prison 
areas.     On the other hand,   though the  system of handling prisoners 
gradually improved in the North,   the practloe of feeding oaptlves as 
24. See  e.g.,   James Schouler, History of the United States of 
America, VI,   413-414. 
25. Davis,   op.   clt.,  p.  453. 
cheaply as possible produced numerous oases of scurvy and other 
diseases among the inmates in all the prisons. But here again, 
it appears that conditions varied from time to time and place to 
place; and, although the whole subject is apparently far more 
complex than it formerly was thought to be, it now seems evident 
26 
that willful atrocities were not committed in either section. 
Unquestionably, the loss of life in the Northern and 
Southern prisons was tragic, but the matter was made worse by the 
intensification of impassioned feelings produced by the tales of 
atrocities often deliberately circulated, and usually widely 
believed, during and after the war. In the North, aside from the 
prison memoirs that were being published, the Government itself 
provided a stimulus for continued recrimination. The propaganda 
resulting from the Nuremberg trials was mild, apparently, in 
comparison with the sensations produced by the Federal trial, in 
27 
November, 1865, of the commander of the Andersonville prison. 
Furthermore, in the earlier era of "return to normalcy" following 
the war. Congress also indulged in the device of "investigating 
26. Hesseltine, op. clt., chape, iii, vi, vii, viii passim. 
27. Ibid., pp. 233-236 passim. 
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committees" on the subject of Southern prison conditions. In 
1869, one of these committees published its findings in a volume 
entitled Treatment of Prisoners of War by the Rebel Authorities, 
in which the committee proposed to record the proofs of "Hebel 
cruelty" for posterity, in order to provide a necessary authori- 
28 
tative condemnation of slavery. 
It seems unfortunate, also, that tne prison issue was kept 
alive by the literary efforts of ex-prisoners and by organized 
29 
groups, such as the Andersonville Survivors* Association;   for 
propaganda on the subject of war prisons seems to have had a far 
more lasting influence on publio opinion than all the heated 
arguments on the more abstract questions of war. Sentiments 
aroused over causes of the war or even over wholesale slaughter in 
battle, no matter how intemperate they might have been at the 
outset, seem to have faded steadily after peace was restored; but 
the emotion generated by tales of suffering individuals appears to 
have penetrated more deeply and receded less quickly — perhaps 
because individual suffering is more easily comprehended and more 
readily captures the imagination. 
28. Ibid., pp. 252-253. 
29. Ibid., pp. 255-258. 
In any event, people in the  post-Civil War period believed 
what they read and heard about the war;   and as these beliefs  became 
legends,   the attitudes  of mind developed during the war were 
perpetuated.     For many years,  the effects  of these sectional 
attitudes were marked,  even though sectional bitterness gradually 
subsided.    Now,   of course,   public attitudes have ohanged considerably, 
and are  still in the prooess of undergoing change.     Obviously,  these 
revised attitudes   are the result of many varying influences and 
events;   but,  at  least one of the  factors making for  change appears 
to be the new appraisals  of history made possible  by advances   in 
historioal methods  and scholarship. 
IV 
EFFECTS OF HISTORICAL REVISION 
ON TEXTBOOKS 
The interest in American history aooelerated by the Civil 
War and the resurgent nationalism which came in its wake also 
tended to stimulate the study of American history in public 
schools.  Prior to 1860, only six states required that social 
studies be taught in elementary and high sohools; but, by 1880, 
the desire to inculcate patriotism and good citizenship had 
inspired the enactment of laws by nearly all the state legisla- 
tures to include history in the school curricula.  Naturally, 
this increased emphasis upon the teaching of history created a 
new and widespread market for textbooks of United States history. 
As might be expected, the earliest textbooks published in 
response to this demand reflected many of the sentiments aroused 
by the war as well as the prevailing spirit of nationalism and 
faith in progress.  If any oauses for the war were oited at all, 
the usual explanations for its origins ~ the moral issue of 
1. Bessie Louise Pierce, Publio Opinion and The Teaching of 
History in the United States (New Yorkt Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), pp. 12-14. 
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slavery, the oonspiracy of wicked men, differences in constitutional 
interpretation, and sectionalism — were presented.  Actually, many 
of the early texts, in accordance with the older historical method 
of chronological recitation, were so condensed and so concerned with 
events that superficially, at least, they appeared to be free from 
2 
partisan bias.   if, however, the pro-Northern or pro-Southern views 
of the writers were not always blatant, evidences of their prejudices 
often appeared in their terminology and choice of words to desoribe 
the War. 
Amusing now in its triviality, but illustrative of the type 
of texts written before the turn of the century, was the variation 
in titles given to the war itself.  Offioially, according to the 
government, it was the "War of the Rebellion."  Southern writers 
termed it the "War between the States."  Northern writers called 
6 .6 
it either "The War of Secession" , or "The War for the Union." 
2. William Swinton, Condensed United States History (New Yorkt 
Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor and Company, 1871), passim. 
3. Charles A. and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of Amerioan 
Civilisation, II, 53. 
4. Alexander H. Stephens, History of the United States 
(Columbia, S.C.i W. J. Duffie, Publisher, 1872), p. 427ff. 
5. Swinton, op. olt., p. 235ff. 
6. William H. Mace, A School History of the United States 
(Chicagoj Rand McNally & Company, 1904), p. 334ff. 
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A later Northern historian, determined to write a more just acoount 
of the episode, compromised with the expression "The War for Southern 
7 
Independence."  The term "Civil War" became standard usage apparently 
only after more professional historians entered the field of textbook 
writing*  It seems that the problem of proper nomenclature still 
persists, however, despite advances in historiography and scholarship, 
for, in preparing their oollege text published in 1945, Oliver P. 
Chitwood and Frank L. Owsley were "...left in a quandary as to how 
to designate the war between the North and South." They felt that, 
sinoe the question of whether or not secession was in violation of 
the Constitution was still open to dispute, "...to be strictly correct 
/theyj  should have used only suoh names as the War for Southern 
Independence and the War of Secession, which are noncommittal on this 
point, rather than Civil War, which if used in the ordinary sense, 
implies the acceptance of the Northern contention that secession 
was illegal." Interestingly enough, this discussion follows 
8 
immediately a statement promising objectivity and "neutrality". 
Other indications of biased points of view appeared even in 
the most skeletal accounts by earlier writers.  Southern authors, 
7, Edward Charming, A Student's History of the United States 
(3d ed. rev.j New Yorki The Macmillan Company, 1917) passim. 
8. Oliver P. Chitwood and Frank L. Owsley, A Short History 
of the American People (Torontoi D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 
1945), I, v-vi. 
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for example, were inclined to employ local place names and at least 
to mention nearly every Confederate officer present on any battle- 
. 9 
field.  Furthermore, short biographical sketches of Southern 
leaders were incorporated in the text, while the prinoipal figures 
10 
of the North were merely named where necessary.   Of course. 
Northern writers were prone to similar treatments of the subject in 
their turn.  The more aroused writers seldom failed to preface the 
names of Northern leaders with a complimentary adjective, whereas 
Southern leaders were dismissed with the word "insurgent". 
In other words, the earlier textbook writers, moralized, 
judged, indioted, or supported their particular cause, and expressed 
their loyalties just as freely as any of the other writers of 
historical literature during the nationalistic period. If they 
were writing from the Northern point of view, as most of them were, 
they saw only the courage and heroic exploits of the Union armies. 
They sinoerely believed that all Southerners were wicked and oapable 
of murdering Northern captives and they said so in their books. If 
9. George F. Holmes, New School History of the United States 
(New Yorki University Publishing Company, 1884), passim. 
10. Susan Pendleton Lee, A School History of the United States 
(Richmond, Va.j B. F. Johnson Publishing Company, 1895), passim. 
11. Benson J. Lo»«ing, a School History of the United States 
(New York! Sheldon ft Company, 1884), passim. 
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they were writing one of the so-oalled "state" histories which were 
12 
so popular   in the  post-war South, textbook writers tended to 
eulogise the local heroes,  and to oite  figures to prove that that 
particular  state had contributed more men,   or  companies,  or regiments, 
as the case might  be,  than any other  state.     These figures were 
derived,  of course,  from the most accessible  sources — the personal 
and partisan accounts of the war leaders;   but they were convenient 
for supporting almost any point of view,  for this was an era when 
statistics   carried increasing conviction.     Doubtlessly,  these 
techniques  and devices  of presentation, though not necessarily 
intended to be misleading,   did foster and perpetuate  impressions 
sympathetic to existing seotional attitudes. 
The   idea of the war as a positive  good was another attitude 
nourished by these early textbook writers.     One popular writer, 
probably influenced by  current nationalistic tendencies,   concluded 
that the war "...though terrible in its effects, has not been 
without some good results.    The extinction of slavery is already 
proving a benefit to the people of the South,  while  it has taken 
away the long-standing subject of political dispute between the 
great sections of the Union."    An additional benefit of the war was 
12.    Pieroe,  op. cit., pp.  41-42. 
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that  it  brought about  closer understanding and greater mutual 
respect  between the North and South;   and,  as a final fillip,  the 
author  added that  "the war has  also made Americans  less puffed up 
and sensational than formerly,  and has  given a more earnest and 
manly oast to the American character. 
This extreme nationalistic point of view was pre-eminently 
Northern,   but,  sinoe Northern textbooks were used in the majority 
of public schools throughout the  country, both this view of the 
results  of the war and the anti-slavery interpretation of its 
causes  and character tended to  become firmly  fixed in the popular 
14 
mind. But, while these oentral themes were   generally predominant, 
certain textbook writers of the  period at least hinted at some of 
the ideas whioh have now replaoed the older  interpretations. 
15 
Underlying economic differences were pointed out by some;   others 
interpreted slavery as a system of labor.   Still others indioated 
that Northern businessmen found the "peculiar institution" profitable 
17 
and became interested in maintaining slavery.   The newer 
IS. Swinton, op. oit., pp. 229-230. 
14. Charles W.   Ramadell  "The Changing Interpretation of the 
Civil War",  loo,  oit.,  p. 7. 
15. See e.g., Maoe, op.   oit.,  p.  296ff. 
16. See e.g., Swinton, op.  clt., p.  237ff. 
17. See e^g., D.  H. Montgomery, The Leading Facts of American 
History   ("The Leading Facts of History Series", Boston,  Oinn k 
Company,  Publishers,  1891), p.   223. 
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psyohological   interpretation was anticipated by one writer who 
pointed out that "...the passions excited by the bitter debate 
over questions   relating to slavery lay at the  bottom of the 
18 
struggle." As early as 1904,  a farsighted historian prepared a 
list  of oauses  for hia text in which aroused feelings appeared 
first,  and lack of able leadership after the deaths  of Clay and 
Webster,   second. 
In view of the prevailing attitudes,   it is not  surprising 
that,  although textbooks of this type were often the most balanced 
and impartial,   some of them were  indicted by such patriotic 
organisations  as the Grand Army of the   Republic.    One fairly popular 
text  of this variety,   Leading Facts  of American History,   by D.   H. 
Montgomery, was found guilty of pro-Southern bias on  seven counts 
at the Twenty-Ninth National Encampment  of the G.  A.   R.  held in 1895. 
On the whole,  the main objections seem to have been that Montgomery 
had alluded to the  courage and devotion of the Southern people,   and 
had slighted the efforts  of the  Union armies — or so the G. A.  R. 
20 thought. On the  other hand,   some of the Southern states were no 
18. Edward Bggleston, A History of the United States  and its 
People   (New York:  D.  Appleton  and Company,   1888), p.   310. 
19. Mace,  op.   oit., pp.   324-325. 
20. Pieroe, op.  oit.. pp.  166-167. 
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more willing to aooept Montgomery'* books  — this time on the 
21 
grounds that they stressed pro-Northern views. 
Despite  the efforts   of patriotic organizations,  textbooks 
after 1900 began to reveal very gradually the   influence of advances 
in historical  research and methods.     Less space was   devoted to 
political  activities and military campaigns,   and more emphasis was 
placed upon social and eoonomic affairs.    Economic   interpretations 
of the Civil War appeared in textbooks written shortly after World 
War  I.    Following the pattern set by  "subjective" historians,  one 
writer stated that he had made "...an effort to show the influence 
of eoonomic  conditions on the politics  of the  country throughout  its 
entire history...".     Conforming with this thesis,  he   informed his 
potential  students that  "...the  slavery contest was  economic in its 
22 
origins and development.     It became  eventually a moral issue." 
Furthermore,  the experiences   of World War I   seemed to have exerted 
a considerable influenoe  on the  attitude toward war.     Even though 
he regarded the Civil War as  inevitable,   at  least one outstanding 
writer indicated that he was not "inspired" by the spectacle of war 
23 
between the  North and South. 
21. Ibid.,  p.   159. 
22. John H.   Latane', A History of the  United States   (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon,   1918),  p. Ti. 
25.     David S.   Mustey, The United States  of Amerioa  (Boston. 
Ginn and Company,   1922),  p.   561. 
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Although textbook writers often have been among the last to 
accept new historical interpretations with the result that the myths 
and attitudes nurtured by early writers have been the most real and 
pervasive, the latest results of fresh investigations and newer 
trends in historical thought generally have appeared first in text- 
books intended for college students, probably because the writers of 
these texts are usually trained historians.  As a result, these texts 
now reveal most of the present trends in historical treatment of the 
Civil War.  In the first place, the episode is reduced to more proper 
proportions in relation to the whole development of the United States, 
and more space is devoted to causes and effects than to military 
campaigns.  Furthermore, at least an equal amount of the discussion 
is given to the Southern and Northern oases, and there seems to be 
a general tendency to treat Northern and Southern conditions together, 
drawing parallels wherever possible.  In addition, modern writers have 
tended to stress the complexity of the causes and character of the 
war, and in general have sought to achieve understanding rather than 
to pass judgment.  It is also noteworthy that recent textbook writers 
usually have adopted the policy of indicating the sources for their 
statements and conclusions, particularly where they have drawn upon 
the more or less definitive studies of the conditions of the war itself. 
^-  
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Since  interpretations  of the causes  of  the war are  necessarily 
speculative and have  been  continuously revised,   some of the latest 
writers  have pointed out the interpretations  of  other historians   in 
24 
addition to their  own. Obviously,  an historian who has  advanced a 
new hypothesis  in monographic publications  and specialised volumes 
will not omit his  interpretation  in preparing a textbook any more 
than other writers have omitted their   beliefs  in the past.    In his 
recent textbook   (written in collaboration with his   faoulty colleague, 
Walter Johnson)  Avery Craven, for example,   stresses the   same 
causative  factors which he elaborated  in his more celebrated works, 
and repeats his  familiar thesis that  the war was  a "repressibls 
25 
confliot". 
The training received by modern textbook writers and 
historians  does not necessarily rule  out prejudioe.     Historians, 
like all individuals,  are influenced by their own values,   background, 
and environment;   and,  apparently, they influence  and are influenced 
by prevailing attitudes.    And there is.  of course,  no sure way of 
measuring the effect on public attitudes of newer interpretations 
or more conscientiously verified accounts  of the  Civil War.     Time 
itself has been a fundamental factor in tempering with reason mutual 
24.    H.   U. Faulkner, American Political and Social  History 
(New Yorkt  F.  S. Crofts 4 Co.,  1941),  p.  317ff. 
85.    Avery Craven and Walter Johnson. The United States 
(Boston. Ginn and Company,   1947), pp.   362ff. 
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group hatreds of the North and South.  In addition, there is 
probably some correlation between the recent efforte of Southern 
leader* to deal more effectively with problems of health, 
education, soil exhaustion, share-cropping, and race relations, 
and the revised interpretations of the role of the South in the 
Civil War*  It may, perhaps, even be hoped that a more significant 
result of such intense study of only one phase of Amerioan history 
will be an increased wisdom and capacity for maintaining peace, 
which may come from a better understanding of the human activities 
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